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THE ONLY GOOD POOR WOMAN:

UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND WELFARE
DOROTHY

E.

ROBERTS *

The goal of some welfare reform proposals is to discourage poor women
from having children. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides a
ready device for challenging these proposals in court. Such challenges, however, invoke a particular tension in the use of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in the context of welfare-the tension between seeking to protect the
private decisions of welfare recipients while at the same time seeking to obtain public assistance for exercising those decisions. This tension stems partly
from the doctrine's attempt to preserve poor people's liberty within a constitutional framework designed to protect only property owners. 1
The Supreme Court has often resolved this tension by failing to find a
constitutional violation when the government conditions welfare benefits on
the waiver of privacy rights. 2 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine may
nevertheless appear to be the indispensable cornerstone of claims that new
welfare regulations violate recipients' right to reproductive autonomy. 3 I argue

* Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. B.A., Yale Universi ty, 1977; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1980. This article benefitted from conversations with Marion S miley and
Lucie White; from comments of participants at the symposium on the doctrine of unco nstitutional
conditions at the University of Denver College of Law, the Class and Reproductive Control panel
at the Crit Networks Conference on Class & Identity, and the symposium on We lfare As We 'd
Like It To Be at Princeton University; and from discussions with Lucie White's Social Welfare
Law class at Harvard Law School and the Harvard University Prograrn in Ethics and t.t1e Professions seminar. I am grateful to the Program in Ethics and the Professions for its research support.
1. Thus, this tension does not arise in the Supreme Court's application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in cases involving property rights , which may explain why property
owners appear to prevail more often L1an welfare recipients. Compare, e.g. , Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (e xtending the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to in validate,
under the Takings Clause, a city 's attempt to condition the grant of a di scretionary building permit
on the donation of property to the government) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S . 398 (1963)
(holding that the denial of unem ployment benefits to persons who refuse to work on Saturdays for
religious reasons violates the First Amendment) with Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S.
360 (1988) (holding denial of food stamps to strikers doe s not violate the First Ame ndment) and
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding denial of medical benefits for abm1ion but not
childbirth). See also Thomas W. Merriil, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public
Goods, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 859 (1995) (using a model of constitutional rights as public goods to
explain the Court's holding in Dolan) . Merrill suggests tha t t.J'Je Court rej t:cted i'il~dicaicl
recipients ' unconstitutional conditi ons claim in Lhe abortion funding cases because "the judiciary
views the right to aborti on, which after all is grounded in the ' right to pri vacy,' 2.s a uniquely private right whose primary significarJce is to l.!1e indi vidual exercising that right." !d. at 875.
2. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S . 587 (1987); M aher v. Roe, 432 U .S . '!-M (1977) .
3. See, e.g., Laurence C. No lan. The Unconstitut ional Conditions Doctrine and iHcndctir:g
Norp/antfor Wom en on Welfar e Discourse , 3 AM . U . J. GENDER & L. 15 (1994): David S . Coale ,
Note, Norplant Bonuses and The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 71 TE:<. L. R:=:·;. 189
(1992). In the face of conservativ e proposals to abai1don the unconstitutiona' cc·:1ditions d cctri ;·,,~
in order to allow the sta te greater po1ver to require citizens to trade their consticui.ionc.l rights fc!'
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in this article that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine offers an impaired
defense against welfare policies that regulate poor women's reproduction.
Although these policies reflect an unjust understanding of the reproductive
liberties of women on welfare, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot
adequately explain why. We should replace it with a vision of welfare that
more affirmatively reconciles the protection of poor women's privacy with the
demand for public suppmi.4
I. CONTRACEPTIVE WELFARE PROPOSALS

Welfare reform measures designed to discourage reproduction by recipients (I will call them contraceptive welfare proposals or laws) are based on the
belief that welfare encourages poor women to bear children, combined with
taxpayer resentment for having to pay to support them. As Representative
Marge Roukema asked during the congressional debate on the Family Support
Act, "how much longer do you think the two-worker couple will tolerate the
welfare state and its cost to them in taxes to support that welfare mother? ...
The answer is that they should not have to. " 5 \Velfare mothers' procreation is
also considered morally irresponsible according !o the premise that people
should only have children they can afford to support. 6 Welfare reform rhetoric
describes childbeaTing by the poor as fueling a cycle of poverty by producing
children who wi ll inevitably depend on the government for sustenance. 7
Sometimes reproduction by particular poor mothers, such as those who are
unmarried or teenagers, is singied out as the target for deterrence. 8

public benefits, it is understandable that liberals anJ progressives would seek to shore up the
doctrine. See, e.g., RiCHARD EPSTEIN, B ARGAlNING 'hlTH THI': STATE ( 1993) (arguiilg that abolishing the unconstitution al conditioilS doctrine would promote economic efficiency).
4. This article expands my critique of t~e unconstitutional conclir.iom: doctrine in the context
of public assistance and First Amendment right~. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. SullivaJ> w1d the
Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 587 ( 1993).
5. 113 CONG. REC. H 11 ,5 15 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1937) (statement of Rep. Rouke ma).

6. See CHRI STOPHER JENCKS, RETH1Nl'.JNG SGC!AL POUCY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE
UNDER CLASS 189-90 ( 1992) (discussing middle-class American norms about childbearing that the
"reproductive underclass" ·,tiolates).

7. See, e.g., lVllCKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY 121 (1992); LAWRENCE M. M E.W, THE
NEW POLmCs OF POVE?..T'{: THE NONWORlUNG POOR IN AMER!CA (1992); CHARLES MURRAY,
LOSING GROUN D: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY

1950-1980 154-66 (1984). I discuss the fallacy o f all

of these premises elsewhere. See Dorothy E. Roberts, hratiorwlity a,uf Sacrifice in the Welfa re
Reform Consensus, 81 U. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming i 995) .
8. The House Republica.11s' Personal Responsib ility Act, for example, contains measures
designed to discourage unwed teenagers from btcorning mothers. It prohibits mothers under t.t'1e
age of 18 from i·eceiving ;\FDC benefits for children born out of wedlock. regardle ss of when aid
is so ught for the child, unless the mother marries t.t'le child's faL1e!· o r someone who adopts u'1e
child. Personal Res;x:nsib iiity Act, H.rr. 4, i 04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1OS (1995) (here inafter Persona1 Responsi bility .Act]. (A_n arncndrncnt to the House bill V·/O:..dd all o'.-V teenage molhers to receive I\~1edic;:jd, fo cd sL::tinps~ and voe chefs to pay for iten1s ":--;eitabi.;; for L'1e care of tht~ child."
Mireya Navarro, Th rea t :Jf a Benefit s Cuwff" Willli Deter Pregnancies?, N.Y . TilvfES , A pr. 17,
1995 .) 'TI1e LA.ct &.lso denies aid fo r children Vlhose paternity is not e s t~ blished 3.rld requires states

to warn a

pre g .n~~ n i"~

un1na:. riecl v¥· on1an of l1er ir:eligibi lity fur goverft£nent a.id un:es5 she 1l1for:ns

u'1e state of ti1e prospec·tiv -e f:-E.her ' :; !d~.::n!.i ty ::~nd cooperate::; ln estaiJiishing the child S pate rnity.
Persc.nai :RespCilsibility .1\ ct~ suprc. , §§ 10 l, 103 . AJtboug h tb]s pr:y;i sivn is airned at establishing
paternity t.~s e8_dy as po:;sible, it rnig h t also p:.-ovidt.~ 8..!.1 inceTn::·'/e to pc.o~- prcg!la.nt \vornen to g::::t an
c.bortion. St·:: Ste ·i e [ :aley & Carol J,'Juzcitis) b-;O lJ.!;e Vo;~s t·:} I:..~ c!s £ Vl.::(far-2 C\tts; Abon'ion ~,;:;-o es
1
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This perception of procreation by the poor as costly 3.JJ.d pathological was
most notably promoted by Charles Murray, who, in 1984, argued that welfare
induces poor women to have babies; 9 in 1993, declared that "illegitimacy is
the single most important social problem of our time; " 10 and in 1994, claimed
that the higher fertility rates of groups with lower average intelligence, who
fall at the bottom of the economic ladder, help to perpetuate welfare dependency.11 Wnile his views were once considered on the political fringe,
Murray now "has a platform in respectable publications and is welcomed as a
savant by Republicans in Congress." 12 These themes run throughout the
House Republicans' proposed Personal Responsibility Act. 13 The bottom line
of this thin.u ng is that, since reproduction by the poor perpetuates poverty,
policies designed to stem their reproduction are an efficient means of at once
reducing poverty and cutting welfare costs.
The government can take several avenues to achieve the goal of reducing
the number of children born to women on welfare. The most benign is to
make contraceptives freely available to welfare recipients. Every state now
ma.\:es Norp1ant available to poor women through Medicaid. 14 This approach
might be combined with the added incentive of offering a cash bonus to women on welfare for using Norplant. Several state legislatures have considered
implementing such a bonus progr2.m. 15 A third option is to deny additional
benefits for children born to women who are already receiving public assistance. If the belief that welfare encourages childbirth were accurate, denying
benefits would remove the incentive for women to become pregnant, or at
least make childbearing more burdensome. Children bom despite the elimination of incentives would be the unfortunate casualties of this detenence
rationale. Several states already have enacted so-called weifare "fam ily caps,"
and others are considering such legislation.16

Win Con cession. O n . T RIB., Mar. 23, 1995, at l (discussing Roman Catholics' and anti-abortion
Repub1icar1s' concern that the Act 's provisions de signed to reduce out-of-wedlock bi::J.hs will encourage pregnant women to ob tain aborti ons); Rote rt Pear, Ca tholic Bishops C"hal!enge Pieces of
Welfare Bill, N.Y. TIMES, lv.!ar. 19, i995, at 1 (same).
9. See MURRA Y, supra note 7, at 154-66.
10. See Charles Murray, Th e Coming W hite Undercla.ss, 'NALL ST. J. , Oct. 29, 1993, at A1 4.
11. See R;Ci-l.AR D j. HERRNST EIN & C HARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: l NTELUGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN A MERIC AN LIFE ( 1994).

12. Paul Starr, Who Owns th!! Future? , T HE AI>IEPJCAt'-l P ROS PECT, Spri ng 1995, at 6.
13. T he preamble of the Personal Responsibi!iry Ac t states that the Ac t's purpose is to " restore the American fa_rnily, reduce illegitim acy. control welfare spendin g ~J1 d red uce welfare dependence. " Sec Personal Responsibility Act, supm note 8.
14. Tcnn Bethell , Norplan t is Welfare State ' s N ew Opiate: Contra ceptive D oesn't Address
Causes of !llegitimate B irths , L.A. Tl MES. Jan . 24, 1993, at tvi5; see aiso T?j\l;>J Lev•in, 5- Year
Contraceptive lmpi.ani Seems Hea ded f!r W ide Use, N.Y. Tl MES , Nov. 29, 199 1, at A l. This
policy is not devoid of compul sio!1. how¢ver. if tl1c state provides !·forplant but 110t other types of

contr?.ception.
15. See lCAN. H.B. 1089, 7 ~-::..:~l Leg., 2d .Sess. (1991 ) (providii1g ';),:omen receiving At!::TIC a
$500 cash bonus for in~e ni ng I'·~orp h!nt) as v,-eli as L1I1 additional $5 0 each year for coDtinued use);
L.<'l~.

H. B.

1 58 4~

l7 th P.. Sess. S

l~~ orp1a.nt) ; 'I'EI,n-L

}(~)

(1 99 1) (cnvardix;g \vornen on \velf:JTe SIOO per year fer usi ng

l-1.8 . 1850 _, 97!.~1 Leg ., 2cl. Sess. ( 1992) (same) .
1r. See iVh_k e Dorni ng ~ :-llelfa;r.:; C'ups Tr_/ t·J .Put Lid ::;n 3ize cf i-r:·an!ilizs: CHL TRiB ., r.;Iar.
12, 1995~ at l: iVieli:1d8. f-Ie n.nebe :~· ger~ .t?.erh£nki.:-tg 1-Yelfare: .Deterri."1g 1;.!ew Birth:;- A Sp zciaf Re port: Si'aie Aid is C:7..ppEti , b:~:r to :vh(:_t Effect?) f·!. ~{. l"'IIvfES, A.pr. 11, 1995, 2 t />:.. J. The P·::rsonal
R~ sp 0!1Sib~lity A.c:~ de·r: ~ e- ~: . ~. FJ.) ~~_' ~: c;"l:~. fi t:~ ror ;.·.Gd i ~ it) r:2. l c h.i ld..!-.~n bon1 t;) .:'~FDC "fec~. p ] en ts c.r to
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A fourth possibility is to use more coercive means to ensure that women
receiving government aid remain infertile. Mandating sterilization of women
on welfare, a strategy used in many states during the first half of the twentieth
century, now seems to be politically unacceptable. 17 But the public might be
willing to impose less permanent methods of regulating poor women 's fertility.
Nm-plant serves this purpose adeptly because it acts on a long term basis and
is reversible. At the same time, since removal requires a minor surgical procedure, it is possible for government authorities to monitor its use. Unlike most
other contraceptives, Norplant ' s effectiveness does not depend on a woman's
constant cooperation. At least two states have proposed legislation to mandate
the use of Norplant as a condition of receiving welfare benefits. 18 Denying
benefits for children born to women on welfare has been condemned by many
as cruel to the innocent children who are punished for their mothers' behavior. 19 A rule requiring Norplant as a condition of receiving welfare avoids
this discomfort, since its objective is to prevent the birth of the children in the
first place. (Of course, children whose mothers refuse to accept the condition
will lose their benefits.) Americans are predisposed to be less concerned about
protecting the reproductive decisions of poor women than the welfare of their
children. As policym ac~ers become increasingly hostile towards poor mothers
on welfare, it is likely that these more coercive proposals will proliferate and
may even prevail. 20
U. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS PROBLEM

It is clear at the outset that contraceptive welfare laws present an unconstitutional conditions problem. They raise the classic unconstitutional condi-

anyone who re ceived A."CDC at a11y time during the 10-month period ending with the birth of the
child. Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 8, § 106 . Supreme Court precedents impose no
obligation on t.'le government to pay women on welfare benefits to support their additional children. See Dar1dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that a state AFDC program provision imposing a maximum E"Jonthly grant per fami ly did not violate the Equal Protection Clause);
see also Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 129 1 (1995) (holding that federal AFDC regulations do
not prohibit states from grouping into a si ngle "assistance unit" all needy children living in the
san1e household unde r the care of one relative even though this rule resu lts in a decrease in maximum per capita AFDC benefits).
17. On tbe other hand, the popularity of tubal ligation and vasectomy as a method of family
pl2jming may have dim inished the public 's concern about the brutality of coercing these procedures . P HILLI ? P. REILLY , The SURGICAL SOLUTI ON: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION
INTI-IE U NTI ED STATES 161 (199 1) . In 1980, the chairman of the Texas Board of Resources proposed steri lizing v;elfare recipients in the state. Ojj'icial Urges Sterilization of Texas Welfare Recip ie nts , N.Y. TI !viES , Feb. 28, 1980; see also Jim Simon, Heavy Hand of Welfare Reform L egislators P lann ing to Get Tough, SEATrLE TIMES , Jan. 31, 1992, at B 1 (discussing Washington state
senator Scott Barr' s proposal to offer $ 10,000 bonuses to welfare mothers who agree to sterilization after the birt}: of their firs t child) .
18. See S .B. 2895, Miss. (1992); H.B. 3207 , S.C. (1993).
i9. h son De?arle, Despising Welfare, P itying Its Young, N. Y. TlMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at 5.
20 . A Newsw eek arlicle reported in 1993 Lhat " legislators in 13 states have proposed nearly
twc· doz.c;;·; oills d-·?.t <J.im to use Ncrpla.nt as an ins trument of social policy." Barbara Kantrowitz &
? at Wi:Jger<. Th ::: No rplcmt Deba!e, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 36; see genera lly Madeline
Benl::y, J:::omment, The Cr.?ation and Perpew..a tion of ihe iYJother!Body Myth: Judi cia l and Leg isiarive En!is tllJ~l!!' ofil/orplo.nt , 41 B UFF. L. REV. 703, 731-58 (1 993) (sur<eying legislative initiat.i_,/eS "C:/ i~t g ·;;::.1f0.r-:: to Nol-p1aJ1t).

t

I
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tions question whether the government may condition the conferral of welfare
benefits on the benef1ciary's surrender of her constitutional right to reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity, although the govemment might choose not
to provide welfare benefits altogether. The governmen t is plainly doing indirectly what it could not do directly.
Few would dispute that it would be unconstitutional-at least under current conditions- for a state to pass a law requi1ing women to use contraceptives.21 The concept of decisional privacy, which seeks to protect intimate or
personal a.ffairs that are fundamental to an individual's identity and moral
personhood from unjustified government intrusion, is firmly established. 22
Freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life has been at
the forefront of the development of the right of privacy .23 Considerable support exists for the conclusion that the decision to procreate is part of the right
of privacy. 24 The decision to bear children is universally acknowledged in the
privacy cases as being "at the very heart" of these constitutionally protected
choices. 25 The Court expressed the constitutional importance of the right to
procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma., declaring the right to bear children " one of
the basic civil rights of man ." 26
The right of privacy, then, pwtects both the choice to bear children and
the choice to refrain from bearing them. Unjustifiably burdening either choice
violates a woman's personJ10od by denying her autonomy over the self-defining decision of whether she will bring another being into the world. Requiring
women to use contraceptives is, in this sense, just as pernicious as forced maternity at the behest of the state. ln addition, man dating such an invasive procedure as Norplant insertion '.vould violate women's due process rights to
bodily integrity J.nd to refuse medical treatment. 27 Since states could not constitutionally pass laws directly mandating that women use Norplant, the argu-

- -------·------------ 21. Nev.~rL'leless, LaJTf Alexamie!· did dispute this assertion at the symposium, arg uing that
there is no absolute righ< to procreate. Although the Constitution does no t protect the right to
procreate absolutel y, in thc.t the right might be uven~om~ by a cornp~Hing state interest, it does
safeguard i.i1dividuals ' procreative decisions from government interference. Aiexander proposed a
limited ;·ight to procreate if one is firm:cially abl e to support one 's children . A hypothetical law
directly limiting procreation on the basis of wealtl1 illustra<es that this con,:eption of Lhe right to
procreate is too nc.rrow . A ciiminal stc.tute punishing individuals for havi ng children without economic means to support them or a legislativ e scheme grantin g pMenting licenses only to individ-

uals \vho rnet fina.ncisl sto_nda.rds \v ould :lt least rc.isc consti::-utioncJ concern .
22. See genzrall_'/ LA1JRENCE :t. 'TRJBE, 1\.lvfERIC/;_"i C ONSTITIITlOHAL L.'\Vi § 15-10 (2d ed .
1988); Jed Rubenfeld, The R.:gh! of Pri :J ri.C';' ~ 102 fu\.R'/. L. P~v . 737 (1989).
23 . See , e.g., Rce v. \Vade ~ 410 U.S . 113 (1973 ) (right to choose v/h et.~er to terrninate a
pregnancy); Cris,,;vold v. Conn-~ c -~icu.t. 331 1J.S . .: ~/ 9 (J965) (right to decide \Vhe ther to use contraceptives).
24. See gEn erally JOHN

A~.

R OBERTSON, r,::HTLD9..EN OC C HO:C"S: .Fr-..EEDOi··{ AND THE f<lEVv'

PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (199-\j .

RE-

25. Car,:;:' v. ?opulaiion S-:-l-"'-.3. IJ1t' l, 431 ·u.s. 6'7 S; rS BS (1977) ; set: .:.-;/:::·c -~~isenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, t~53 ( 1972) ('(If ~.l ; .: ; rLs'ni. of p ri "ll ~J: y n1 e ~·ns c.ny!tL~ ~t 6~ i ~: :3 tJ! ~ 1·igh;: c{ the individual,
tnarried or single , to be fr~·~ .frorn UEY-rEr.r::lnt:::d g ov;: rn..lT!eD~al i!-:trus.ioi! i n ~o rnatt;_:rs so :fEndarnentally ~.ffecting a persc·n RS til·~ d-ecision N;.1et"h<::r to bec~I o.~- t.cge.t ::1 child.. ") .

note 3 ~ :;::t 2C 5---CB.
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ment goes, they cannot achieve this end indirectly by conditioning welfare
payments on Norplant use.
This articulation of the unconstitutional conditions argument does not
guarantee the invalidation of contraceptive welfare laws. The Supreme Court
has avoided the unconstitutional conditions problem by distinguishing between
direct state interference vvith a protected activity and the state's mere refusal to
subsidize a protected activity. The former, the Court concedes, raises a constitutional issue because it involves state action, whereas it characterizes the
latter as a constitutionally insignificant failure to act. Embedded in this distinction is the prevalent understanding of constitutional protections that extends
only to the individual's negative right to be free from unjustified state intrusion and that measures state action from a baseline of the current arrangements
of wealth and privilege. 28 Under this reasoning, it is possible to characterize a
condition on benefits as a constitutional nonsubsidy rather than an unconstitutional penalty.
The Court's most developed articulation of this doctrinal sleight of hand
can be found in a series of cases concerning the government's obligation to
subsidize the reproductive decisions of poor women. In these cases, the Court
refuse d to require the state or federal government to pay for the cost of abortion services for poor women, even though the government pays for the expenses incident to childbirth. 29 The abortion fu nding cases raise an unconstitutional conditions problem when the government's refusal to pay for abortions is viewed as a condition on the receipt of Medicaid funds-pregnant
women may receive medical benefits as long as they do not use them to exercise their right to obtain :m abortion. T he Court nevertheless upheld this condition , reasoning,
[a]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a

woman's choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation .... [I]t simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of
choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial
resources to avail herseif o:f the fu1l range of protected choices. 30
Can the government claim, as it did successfully in the abortion-funding
cases, that by conditioning weifare payments on birth contr:)l it is not preventing welfare recipients from exercis ing their reproductive rights? The answer
may depend on which type of contraceptive law is at issue . Unlike the laws in
the abortion --funding c<:ls~ s , Norplant mandate s impose more than the requirement that we1fare fu nds be spent en the purpose for which they were intended--child care and not child bearing . They do not just fail to provide funds for
an nctiv\ty; mth<:r, ti .ey require that v.;e}fare recipients undergo an affirrnative---ill"ld invasive---procedure . Women vvho agree to the condition in order to
rece1\'e A~.FD C~ payrnents do not have the opt1on of exercising their constitu-

28 .

5:'e.;

~r\ 3S

P..

s·u ~··iSTEU'-1 ) ~THE P.~l;.TY.A L CONSTITUT:ON

(1993) ; David /\.

Straus~,

DL-te Pro-

·:.:. :?. S£:: Rust'.'. S ulliv&li , 500 U.3 . 173 (1 991); \Veb~~~er v . .P..eprodu:: tiv,:; 1-lealth Servs., 492
U.S. 4 )i_) ( l 98 S\): I--~ ;uTis 'I . 1\'i c ·?~c~e , -<-t;.8 U.S. 2.97 ( l9SO;.; ?·,1 2.};--:r v. Rc:::, 43 2 U.S . t~-6 4 ( 1977) .
J ~:_) .
i lc.xris ·,;. J\'k.:28.e , '-t<-8 t J..S . 297 (19gQ) .
1
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tiona! right to procreate through private means. The government's condition of
Norplant insertion completely forecloses their reproductive choice. Conversely,
women who wish to exercise their right to procreate, and therefore refuse to
use Norplant, must pay the high price of losing their benefits. 3 1
In contrast, it would be more plausible for the state to claim that offering
cash bonuses for Norplant use implements a legitimate decision to fund birth
control and not childbirth. Recipients might counter that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine forbids bonus programs because they make indigent women pay more than wealthier women-the cost of forgoing the bonus-to exercise their right not to use Norplant. 32 Still, it is hard to make a convincing
argument that offering poor women free Norplant, as well as bonuses to use it,
leaves them worse off than if the program did not exist at all. These women
are not forced to choose between starvation and Norplant use, but only between accepting the bonus and its condition, or not. Norplant bonus programs
arguabl y increase poor women's reproductive options more than the laws
denying abortion funding, which the Supreme Court upheld in Maher and
M cRae.
III.

T HE RESPONSE TO THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL C O NDITIONS D OCTRINE

The concept of welfare entitlements, which welfare rights activists successfully advocated in the 1960s and 1970s, is quickly eroding. 33 Conservative politicians and resentful taxpayers disclaim ailY obligation to support
welfare recipients' decision to have children. Legislators promote their contraceptive welfare proposals in terms of savings to hard worldng citizens. For
example, the sponsor of the Ka.ilsas bill offering cash bonuses for Norplant use
claimed that, "[b] y any set of objective cri teria, the creation of the program
has the potential to save the taxpayers millions of their hard-earned dollars ." 34
The res ponse to the unconstituti onal conditions claim, then, is likely to be,
"sure, poor women have a right to make reproductive d:::cisi ons, but why
should I have to pay for them?" 35

31. See Ly nn A. Baker, Th e Price of Rights: Toward a Positive Th eory of Unconstitutional
Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 11 85 (1990) (presenting a pos iti ve theory of unconstitutional
conditions that "asks whether the effect of the challenged condition is to re quire persons unabl e to
earn a subsistence income, and otherw ise eligible for the pertinent bene [i t, to pay a hi gher price to
engage in that consti tutiona ily protected activity than similarly situated persons e 2.ming a subsisten ce income").
32. See Coale , supra note 3, at 21 4 (proposing a rule "l imiting states to the power to selecti ve ly reimburse a percentage of the marke t p1ice of Norplant"); see also John R. Hand, Note,
Buying Fertiliry: Th e Constitutionaliry of Welfare Bonuses for Welfare iHothers Who Submit to
Ncrplant Insertion, 46 VAND. L. REV. 715 , 71 9-20 (1 993) (presenti ng iUl " ideal" uncons titutional
conditions argume nt against Norp lam bonuses, but predicting that it is likely to fai l).
33. The proposed Person al Responsibility Act replaces federa l entitle ments to A_.-c:Dc and
other welfa"-::: progr<Uns ·-.v ith block grants to the st<Hes. Elizabet..'J Shogren, H ome OKs Welfare
Overh.a.ul Tho.r C uts Off Aid Gua1ail!ees , L. A . TJMES , Mar . 25, 1995, 0.t A 1.
34. Tc.n1 ar Le v/in , A. Plan to Pny ~ie!jtJ.rc J14others for BiTth CentraL, f·LY . T:!iVjES~ Feb. 9,
i99 l , 3.t r\9 .
35. Rol and C orning, the z~uthor of Wlt South Co_rvlizta bill nla_nd ati ng l\Jorp1ant in se njo n ~
express::d th is seniirnent on nati onal t~;i cv ision: "They can have ell the ch.l ldren they waJJ t. They
jt: st hav e to pay for them ." Prirnetirne. Live: End of lnit.c cence (f\. BC te ltvi::iio n broadcast, Sept. 9 ,
1993), avai lable in LEXIS, Nev1s Librarj~ Script File. He axgued tha~ his bill, if enacted, \-·,.,;ould
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As these comments reveal, many legislators and their constituents will
have a hard time seeing contraceptive welfare laws as exacting from women
on welfare a higher price for exercising their rights. In their mind the proposals do not charge poor women for having children; they simply decline to
subsidize this activity. Thus, although some contraceptive welfare measures
may in one sense affirmatively impose a deterrent "above and beyond those
economic deterrents that are a natural concomitant of a market economy," 36
their proponents see them as replacing the constraints on poor women's reproductive decisions that would exist but for the state's generosity. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine cannot adequately explain why the state should
nevertheless support the private decisions of welfare recipients.

IV. WHAT'S WRONG WlTH THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
A. The Doctrine's Functions
By asserting the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, claimants accept the
premise that the government is under no obligation to subsidize poor women's
reproductive decisions. They must renounce any claim to redistribution of
resources necessary for reproductive liberty. The briefs of litigants who use
the doctrine as a shield against government regulation begin with the partial
surrender, "of course, we would never suggest that the government is affirmatively required to give us any support at all." 37 This concession explains the
need for the doctrine.
The unconstitu tional conditions doctrine serves as a method for identifying
"a characteristic technique by which the government appears not to, but in fact
does burden ... liberties." 33 It is needed only to explain how a government
condition on f-unding could possibly be unconstitutional when the government
has no obligation to provide funding in the first place. If the government may
constitutionally deny the gro.nt altogether, why should recipients be heard to
complain about a restriction? The doctrine reveals that, despite the logic of
this question, the govemment nevertheless may be violating a constitutional
right. Thus, under the pre valent understanding of privacy rights, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine appears to be an indispensable first step of arguments challenging the constitu tionality of contraceptive welfare lavvs. 19

-- - - - - - - - - -·
save taxpayers in hi s state $36 milli o n in welfare '.U1d medical costs in L~e first ye ar. i d.
36. Ba..i<er, supr•-' note 31, at 1219.
37 . See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 1 i, R ust v . Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No. 89-1391)
("No one has a ;ight to a subsid y for the ex-ercise of rights to speech a..'ld privacy. "); Brief of the
Commornvealth of t·il9ssachnsetts, the Center for Constitutional R ights et al. as A1nici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 14, R!~si, 500 U. S. 173 (Nos . 89-1391 , 89-1392) ("[A]mici do not suggest
I:J~ at ule g ov -=r-r._i11en~ is 2fftrrn aLiveiy I"equired to provide \·;omen v;ith information reg8sding u~eir
post-preg nc~n cy repr oci.t.~c ti ·'Je op t~ ons . ").

33.
( 1989).
39.

K.athlet;n I'tl. Su1liv?.D,

Uncon..,~. n·tt~! i onal
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine functions like a pair of eyeglasses
that enables us to see the infringement of liberty obscured by our faulty constitutional vision. Why do we need this corrective device in order to understand the harm of requiring poor women to use Norplant in order to survive?
If the government were required to subsidize the activities at issue, and if
reliance on public assistance therefore did not constitute a waiver of privacy,
there would be no place for a special doctrine to prohibit government conditions that threaten these activities. It is our inability to defend poor women ' s
reproductive liberty in terms of traditional constitutional discourse that forces
us the rely on this weak-kneed doctrine. Moreover, because the doctrine focusses on the violation of individual rights, rather than on the government's conditional spending as a system of power, it often permits individuals to barter
away their rights in exchange for benefits. 40
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine also functions like a bandage to
patch up the gaping hole in our constitutional framework designed to protect
the liberties of economically independent citizens. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is conceived as a way of preserving, within the baseline of
present economic inequality, "spheres of private ordering from government
domination. " 41 It maintains the boundary between the private realm and state
power stemming from the government's largesse. (This is part of the overall
liberal project of preserving a sphere of individual privacy from government
interference.) The unconstitutional conditions doctrine tries to fill the gap,
created by the dependence of the poor, in the theory that "[a] right to private
property, free from government interference, is . . . a necessary basis for a
democracy." 42 It gives to propertyless citizens a dollop of the protection ordi-

Chimera of Constitutional Consisten cy, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 989 (1995). Nevertheless, I argue
that the doctrine obscures more constitutional violation than it illuminates. Professor Schauer
suggested to me at the symposium that the difference in our views of the doctrine may lie in the
plausi ble reach of judicial power. Schauer believes that judges are constrained to act within the
limits of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, while I advocate that judges apply a more positive understanding of rights.
40. See MARTHA A. FlNEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 185 (1995). Thomas Merrill notes that, according to this view
of rights, "a doctrine that forbids individuals to sell their constitutional rights smacks of paternalism, and seems to deny the moral autonomy of the individual." Merrill, supra note I, at 869 (advocating a model of constitutional rights as public goods that rejects their conception as valuable
entitle ments belonging to individuals); see also Marion Smiley, Private Lives and Public Welfare:
A Critical Reconstruction of the Concept of State Paternalism· 8 (unpublished manuscript on file
with au thor) (criticizing the definition of state paternalism as a violation of individual liberty) .
41. · Sullivan, supra note 38, at 1506; Kathleen M . Sullivan, Un constitutional Conditions and
the Distribution of Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 327, 330 (1989); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Why the Unconstiturional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (wilh Particular Reference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv . 593, 601 (1990) ("[T]he current constitutional
mainstream[] sees L'Je unconstitutional conditions doctrine as an effort to preserve legal requirements of governmental neutrality under different social and economic conditions."). Another way
of putting it is that the doctrine sets a limit on economic inequality by prohibiting the
government's power to impose a surcharge on the poor for exercising their constitutiona l rights.
Professor Ba..~er argues that the core of the doctrine's consistency in the context of public assistance lies in "the Court's tacit attempt to ensure a certain non-wealth-depe ndent equality of constitutional rights within the constraints of our market eco nom y." Baker, supra note 31, at 11 88.
42. Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 9 15
(1993).
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narily provided by ownership of private property so that they may, in a limited
way, belong to the democratic polity. As Cass Sunstein explains,
the creation of property rights should be seen as an unconstitutional
conditions doctrine writ very large. The idea is that government may
not use its power over property to pressure rights in general; the
existence of property rights generates a strong barrier against this
form of pressure, just as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
provides a degree of insulation in narrower settings. 43
Sunstein 's comparison helpfully highlights the relationship between property, liberty, and unconstitutional conditions, but I would stress even more
than Sunstein the inferiority of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
property rights. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine tries to squeeze the
propertyless into a constitutional framework designed to include only property
owners.
In short, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine accepts the current unequal distribution of wealth, as well as the view of liberty as protection against
state interference in that unequal arrangement. 44 It attempts to minimize the
harm to those who fall at the bottom (or completely out of bounds), without
changing the basic order of things.
B. The Doctrine's Paradox

This view of unconstitutional conditions is paradoxical because it seeks to
immunize a privaie sphere from state interference while at the same time
requesting public assistance. It seeks to disconnect the demand for privacy
from government intrusion and the demand for government intervention
through financial support. It relies on the liberal resistance to government
while hoping for the illiberal assistance of government. In order to determine
the constitutionality of the condition, the doctrine requires us to close our eyes
for a moment and pretend that poor women are not dependent on government
assistance; then ~we may open our eyes the next moment and plead for governn1ent support for their decision to have children. 45

43 . Jd.at9 16.
44. Sunstein notes that his defense of property 1ights is not inconsistent wiLlJ redistributive
programs . See id. at 91 7 (proposing redistributive programs designed "to bring about at least
rough equali iy of opportunity a;1d, even more important, freedom from desperate conditions, or
from circums tam:c:s lhat imJ:,-ode basic human functioning"); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at
l33-40 (aiso proposing redistributive programs). The unc onstitution a l conditions doctrine, however, serves to ave>id Lhe need for such redistribution. For an argument that the Framers ' view of
~; l·ope rty , upon \vhich Sunstein relies, would justify a more expa..11sive redi stribu tion of v;ealth than
.:.;unstein propo:;e,., ~ee Wi lli arn E. Forbath, Why !s This Rights Talk Different fr om Ail Other
Righ!s Ta lk? D·emcring ihe Cmm and Reimagining the Constitution , 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1788
:1nte:; a similar dilernrna posed by u~e libertosian a pproach to state paterfo~ individuals. Srndey argues that Ule concept cf
.'ti.lte pat~ rnaii:;m ;:,sa violati on of a..r1 individual 's r!ght to free c hoic ~ in rhe private sphere fo;-cr::s
lJS to choo:;c be t' ·:~eei! acce pting st:He p3ten1alisrn in the interests of providing we1fru·e and letting
~n d i v i~ur.! ~S St\ff':.:;J- }n the in.~en~s ts of preserving their nutonom y. See S!n il ey, su,t:ro. note 40, at 5.
4 ).

~,:h-~j,Jn Strri ~ey
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine inevitably cmmbles as a device
for maintaining the boundaries between private and public spheres because it
fails to justify the affirmative demand for public support for private decisions.
This does not mean that making these private and public demands is necessarily inconsistent. My point is that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does
not help us to reconcile them. The growing conservative assaul t on welfare
spending may finally compel us to abandon the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in this context and confront directly the social and political implications of citizens' reliance on government welfare. Instead of seeking indeterminate answers through unconstitutional conditions analysis, we would inquire
directly into the substantive constitutional values at issue-the boundaries of
women's right to reproductive autonomy and of poor citizens' right to participate in the political community.
C. Dependence as a Waiver of Privacy

Because the unconstitutional conditions doctrine maintains the liberal
boundary between public and private realms, it fails even to address most
government interference in the private lives of welfare recipients. The sphere
of privacy protected by liberal rights largely evaporates once the individual
invites in state assistance. An individual's acceptance of government benefits
is deemed to constih1te a waiver of privacy. The Court has routinely allowed
the state to regulate poor families by conditioning benefits on confo rmance to
various mandates. Since families are not entitled to government support, the
Court reasons, the government may force them to break up, rearrange, shriP~lc
and open up for inspection in order to qualify for benefits.46 Although the
Court might find an egregious invasion of poor families' privacy to be unconstitutional, most of the day-to-day decisions of family life remain vulnerable to
state regulation. 47 This use of the government ' s spending power to supervise
the everyday lives of poor fami lies is not even analyzable as an unconstitutional conditions problem because the government has not interfered with any
constitutionally protected activity by the recipients.43
This loss of ptivacy often entails state intrusion in welfare recipients'
reproductive decisionmaking. From the inception of welfare programs in
America, states conditioned payments on mothers' compliance with standards
of sexual and reproductive behavior. 49 The Social Security Act, for example,

46. See Lucy Billings, The Choice Between Living with Family }rfembers and Eligibility for
Government Benefits Based on Need: A Constitutional Dilemma, 1986 UTAl-1 L. REV . 695; Michael S. Wald, State lniervention on Belwlf of "Neg lected" Chiidrer. : Standards fo r Removal of
Children fro m Th eir Homes, .i'vfonitoring the Sia tv.s of Children in Foster Care, and Termina tion
of Parentai Rights, 28 STAN . L. REV. 623 (1976); see aiso Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987) (upholding AFDC regulation de termining families' eligibility for benefits despite its negativ e effects on families' chosw living arrangements); LyEg v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (re-

jecting constitu tional challenge to a provision in federal Food Stamps program L}Jat determined
eligibility based on households); Wyrna:1 v. James, 4DO U.S . 309 ( 197!) (rejecting we l far;-;
mothe r's right to resist st.ae horne inspection as a condition of we lfare eligibili ty).
47. S;ce FlNE:'vlA.N, :.uprc r1ote 40, at 185 .
48. Se e Lynn A. B2J<er, Bargaining for Public Assistance, 72 DEN'/. U. L. REV. 949 (i995).
49 . For his torical accounts of we lfare poiicy's regu iatjon of women a.nd their farnil ie:; . see

ij
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allowed states to condition eligibility for Aid to Dependent Children upon
mothers ' sexual morality through suitable-home or "man-in-the-house"
rules. 50 More recently, women on welfare have been required, as a condition
of receiving benefits, to undergo mandatory paternity proceedings that include
state scrutiny of their intimate lives. 5 ' Under the Family Support Act of 1988,
the states are required to meet federal standards to establish the paternity of
children born out of wedlock as a means of procuring child support from the
absent fathers. 5 2 The House Republicans' Personal Responsibility Act contains more coercive measures: it denies AFDC benefits for a child whose paternity has not been established and directs states to warn unmarried pregnant
women of their ineligibility for state aid unless they cooperate in establishing
the child ' s paternity. 53
In her recent book, Th e Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other
Twentieth Century Tragedies, Martha Fineman argues that the law confers
privacy only on the "traditional" family, composed of a husband, a wife , and
their children. 54 Privacy doctrine does not shield from state intrusion single
mothers, including women who have children outside of marriage and divorced mothers:

t'

j
'

I
I

l

I

If nonintervention is the norm, bureaucratic decisions are burdened,
and the institution of family can be set up practically and theoretically
as a construct to mediate against the power of the state. The private
family enjoys the noninterventionist norm; the expectations and
claims these favored units have vis-a-vis the larger society are unavailable to single mother families. 55

Fineman also notes that " priv ate" traditional families receive huge public
subsidies through government and other programs, such as tax breaks, government-backed mortgages, and employer-subsidized health and life insurance. 56
Unlike "public" families, however, their reliance on government support does
not entai l a loss of privacy. Although Fineman is correct that the denial of

r

I

MIMI ABROMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT ( 1988); LINDA GORDON , PITIED BlJT NOT ENT:TLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTOR Y OF WELFARE ( 1994).
50. Luc y A. Williams, The Ide ology of Division: Beha vior Modification Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 7 19, 723-24 (1992).
5 1. FINEMAN, supra note 40, at 186; see Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 39 1 (1975) (approving
requirement of we lfare mothers' ass istance in paternity actions) ; Allen v. Eichler, No. 89A-FE-4,
1990 WL 58223 (De l. Super. Ct. 1990) (order denying benefi ts to a woman who refused to submit
a calendar on whic h she had allegedl y written the names of her sexual partners).
52. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, 2344 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S .C.).
53 . Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 8, §§ 101 , 103.
54. FINEMAN, supra note 40, at 177-93 .
55. !d. at 180; see also Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family , 1979 SUP. CT. REv.
329, 339-<lc() (noting that the Court 's protection of pare nta l decisionm aking depends on parents'
success "i n bringing obedient social conformance from their childre n") ; Martha Minow , Th e Free
Exercise of Families, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV . 925, 944 ("The state can defend many burdens on
ind ividual choice in the name of a state interest in preserv ing or supporting the ' traditional' family .").

56. FiNEMAN, supra note 40, at 19 1; see also GORDO N, supra note 49, at 1-1 3 (describ ing
'.he stratification of the United States we lfa re system) .
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single mothers' privacy is based on patriarchal definitions of family, it is also
true that dependence on government aid provides an additional rationale, as
well as the opportunity, for state regulation. 57 Wealth can help to buy the
presumption of privacy.
V. WHAT'S WRONG WITH GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON PROCREATION?

An alternative approach to government's conditional spending focusses on
its systemic political impact instead of its infringement of individual women's
(waivable) rights. 58 We might examine how this use of government largesse
perpetuates unjust relationships of power in our society. Contraceptive welfare
laws degrade the dignity and equal status of poor citizens. This political dimension is revealed by comparing welfare proposals with eugenic policies that
proliferated in America during the first half of the twentieth century. 59 Contraceptive welfare laws do not implement eugenic policy; they do not seek to
improve the nation's stock through genetic selection. Nevertheless, we can
understand the injustice of conditioning welfare on relinquishing reproductive
autonomy by examining what these proposals share in common with eugenic
programs.
The salient feature of both eugenic sterilization laws and contraceptive
welfare proposals is their imposition of society's restrictive norms of procreation . Denying someone the right to bear children deprives her of a basic part
of her humanity; it constitutes a denial of her human dignity and equ al status
in society. 60 It is grounded on the premise that people who depart from social
norms do not deserve to procreate. Carrie Buck, the nineteen-year-old whose
involuntary sterilization was held constitutional by the Uni ted States Supreme
Court,6 1 was punished by sterilization not because of any mental dis ability,
but because of her deviance from society's social and sexual norms. 62 Indeed,
the state ' s reasons for sterilizing Carrie Buck in 1921..1.-----because she ·was poor

57. I disc uss elsewhere how racism interacts wi u'l patri arch y in lim iting th::: privacy of poor,
single mothers. See Dorothy E . Robert.s, Racism and Patriarchy in the !vieaning of lv!otherhood, in
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST T!-:.'EORY AND THE L EGAL REGULATI ON OF MOTHERHOOD 22 4 (Martha A. Fineman & Isa belle Karpin eds., 1995). I note that " G'l e Sta[.~ has alw ay s c onsidered Black
mothers, whether married or single, to need public superv ision and not to be entitled to privacy.
Thus, the 'public ' single mother has ne·ier had a Black co unterpart in the ' private ' family." !d. at
248 n.6.
58. Kathleen Sullivan's interpret2.ti on of the unconstitution al conditions doctrine as a tech nique for contesting the " system ic effect of conditions on distribution of righLc; in the poli ty as a
whole" offers another systemic approach to cond itional governmen t spendin g. She descri bes one
invidious effect as the creation of a constitutional caste as a resul t of discrimi;,ati ng among rightholde rs on the bas is of their relative dependency on a gov ernmen t benefit. See S uiliv an , supta
note 38, at l '-~21 , l ~·89 - 9 9 .

59. See genzrally TviARX I-1. ~-L\LLER, EUGENI CS: I-lEr<.EDIT,..\ R lPJ'-! }\ TflTUDES IN A.NfERlC AN
THOUGHT ( 1963); REILLY, supra note 17 (discussing involunwr y sterili zc.Licn).
60. Dorolhy E. P... o be rts~ Punish ~·ng D n,!g /·\.ddic!s ~!Vh a Have B ~..1bies : V!on-ze n of Co!or,
Equality and the Right ofPri·,}acy , 104 i-IAR;I . L. R E·v·. 1419 , 147 2 (199 1).
61. See Bur:::c v. Bell, 2 7 t.~ U.S. 100 (1 927).
62 . See S te phen J. Gou ld , C'arric Sue/( s Daug ht.r: ;··~ 2 C o r~ JsT . :·= o ~,..I r-r ;E:·.J"T,-\1~ -~-- 331 , 336 (1935)
('"Heo.· cuse n;:: v .~ r ·-;;: a:;; .::bout rncnt.al :-1-::fici;:nc y; i·~ \'..'as .'::\} ~?/ 3y s a C t2.t.. : r o"f s:;;;(ual tL:Jrality a.nd
social d e v i ~nc e . . .. 'T\vo ge!lerc.;.t.l0ns Gf b~s l.Brd s ?Je C1i cugh .':) .
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and had become pregnant out of wedlock-were precisely the same as the
state's reasons for enacting contraceptive welfare laws today. 63
Eugenicists framed their arguments not only in terms of improving the
race, but also in terms of reducing the cost of subsidizing the unfit. In his
celebrated study of a degenerate family, The Jukes, R.ichard L. Dugdale included detailed calculations of the amounts the Jukes had cost New York state
by 1877. He estimated the family's financial burden to society at
over a million and a quarter dollars of loss in 75 years, caused by a
single family 1,200 strong, without reckoning the cash paid for whiskey, or taking into account the entailments of pauperism and crime of
the survivors in succeeding generations, and the incurable disease,
idiocy, and insanity growing out of this debauchery, and reaching
further than we can calculate. 64
Later, the country's leading eugenicist, Charles Davenport, asserted,
[i]t is a reproach to our intelligence that we as a people, proud in
other respects of our control of nature, should have to support about
half a million insane, feeble-minded, epileptic, blind and deaf, 80,000
prisoners and 100,000 paupers at a cost of over 100 million dollars
per year. 65
Government control of reproduction in the name of science, social policy,
or fiscal restraint masks racist and classist judgments about who deserves to
bear children. The contraceptive welfare proposals implement a belief that
poor people, especially Blacks, are less entitled to be parents. The debate
about Norplant and welfare was initiated by an editorial in the Philadelphia
Inquirer that proposed Norplant as a solution for the high poverty rate of
Black children. 66 After the public outcry, which led to a printed apology ,67
few policy makers have explicitly directed their proposals at Black women. 68
Yet welfare reform remains closely tied to racial politics. Although most
families who receive Ai=<VC are not Black, Black women disproportionately
re ly on this form of government aid to support their children. 69

63. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60
N.Y.U. L. R EV. 30, 51 (1985).
64. RICHARD L. DUGDALE, THE JUKES 167 (1891).
65. CHARLES B. DAVENPORT, HEREDITY IN RELATION TO EUGEN1CS (1911).
66. See Donald Kirnelman , Poverry and Norpiant: Can Contraception Reduce the
Underc!ass, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 12, 1990, at A18.
67. See An Apology: The Editorial on Norplant and Poverty Was Misguided and
Wrongheaded, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 23, 1990, at C4.
68. David Duke is a notable exception. Du ring h is successfu l campaign for election to the
Louisiana legislature, Duke, a former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, ran on a platform of
·'concrete proposals to reduce the illegitimate birthrate and break the cycle of poverty that truly
enslaves ?,nd harms the black race." WILLIAM H. T UCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL
RESEARCH 294 (1994) (citation omitted). These programs included making welfare contingent on
steriliza:ion and offering cash bonuses to women on •...velfare who consented to the procedure.
D uke was the sponsor of tht Louisiana bill offering cash bonuses for Norplai1t insertion. Duke is
also ai1 outspoken proponent of e ugenics. See Craig Flourney, I)u/ce Says fle's Proud of Years as
Klan Chief. D ALLAS 0,10RN!NG N EWS, June 17 , 1992, at A l (qu oting Duke as saying in 1985 that
the "'real ans\ver to the \Vorlc.l ':.; probic:nisl is "prornoring Lt~e best strains} ule best individu-

69.

See Co;''/1 M ITTEE Ot·.f V! AYS Al"fD iVLE ANS, U.S. l-:lO USE or REPRESENTAT!\!ES, OVERVIEW
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Moreover, the American public associates welfare given to single mothers
with the image of the mythical Black "welfare queen" or teenager who deliberately becomes pregnant in order to increase the amount of her monthly
check. 70 It is fair to say, then, that welfare policies designed to discourage
childbearing wi ll disproportionately affect Black women and may be targeted
at these very women.
During the eugenic movement's heyday in America, many poor women
were judged mentally deficient and were briefly institutionalized in order to
undergo sterilization. 71 A 1928 Wisconsin study of women who were discharged after being sterilized in institutions for the feeble-minded found:
"Many mentally deficient persons by consenting to the operation are permitted
to return, under supervision, to society where they become self-supporting
social units and acceptable citizens. Those inmates unwilling to consent to the
operation remain segregated for social protection as well as individual welfare."72 These poor women's social acceptability was contingent on their consent to sterilization. Women who agreed to the procedure were rewarded with
permission to enter society. Those who refused were punished with social
segregation.
This restriction on "feeble-minded" women's ability to participate in society inflicts the same injury as the contraceptive welfare proposals. The harm
of unconstitutional conditions is not to be found solely in the conditions they
place on government benefits (seen as the violation of individual rights), but in
the conditions they place on poor women's acceptability for citizenship. Poor
women are entitled to the benefits of society only if they agree not to reproduce. According to these policies, an acceptable poor woman is one who consents to use birth control: the only good poor woman is an infertile poor wom an.
VI. EXPLAINING PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR "PRIVATE" DECISIONS
If we reject the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the context of
welfare, we are left to make an affirmati ve claim to public assistance for "pri vate" decisions. Such a claim is incomprehensible under current constitutional
doctrine because of the barrier it has erected between public and private domains. In order to claim government assistance, then, we must challenge this
wall of constitutional thinking.

Americans' resentment at paying for poor women's reproductive decisions
stems from the particular unfairness assoc iated with taxation for the purpose of
providing public assistance to the poor, as well as with public support of pri-

OF ENTiTLEMENT PROGRAMS 1994 GREEN BOOi< 4-44 ( 1994); T eresa L. Arn ett, Black Women and
AFDC: il-fa!cing E ntirlement Out of Necessity , in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 280 (Linda
Gordon ed., 1990) .
70. See P.A.T RJClA H. COLLI NS, BL.A.C( t"'EMINlST THOUGHT: K NO\VLEDGE, CON 3Cl-::)USNESS,
.-\J"'D THE P OLIT!CS OF EMPOWERMEl'-1! 77 (1991) ; Gwendol yn M i a~<. Welfare Reform in H istoricai
Perspecti ve, 26 CONN . L. REV. 879 , 89 1-92 (199,~) .
71. REILLY, s:-:pra note 17, at 95-100.
72. !d. at 10 1-02 (emphasis added) .
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vate matters. 73 The law circumscribes property rights in a number of ways,
and the government confiscates citizens' property in the form of taxes for a
variety of purposes. Tax money even goes to many redistributive programs,
such as social security, farm subsidies, and corporate bail outs. Nevertheless,
citizens reserve a special condemnation for welfare that redistributes income to
the poor. Lee Anne Fennell locates this uniqu e sense of offense to property
rights in welfare's violation of norms connecting property to work:
This added element of distaste relates to the perceived unfairness of
confiscating money-money by and large earned through work-for
the purpose of providing an income to able-bodied, working-aged
persons who have failed to earn their own living through work. It is a
short step to the assertion that the more well-off are being forced to
work for the benefit of others (and rather undeserving others, at that),
at which point analogies to "forced labor" spring readily to mind. 74
This sentiment about welfare's unfairness has long been buttressed by the
vilification of welfare recipients as undeserving and morally blameworthy. 75
Added to this source of unfairness is the view that public remedies should
be reserved for publicly-caused problems; citizens must rely on private means
to solve problems of their own making. If citizens request public assistance for
private matters, according to this view, that assistance justifies state regulation
of their private decisions . This is why receiving welfare is seen to deprive
poor people of privacy. The critical foundation of this understanding of welfare is the premise that both the poor and the nonpoor are responsible for their
economic positions, that both poverty and property are derived from indiv idual
merit.
Claims to public assistance for private decisions must refute this view of
welfare's unfairness. Ti1ey might be based on notions of reparations for past
injustice or collective responsibility for current inequalities. To begin with, our
current mm:ket syste m benefits decently employed or otherwise wealthy citizens at the expense of others who work for poverty wages or cannot fin d jobs.
Free market capitalism , as well as American fiscal policy, guarantees that a
portion of the population -yvill be unemployed at any given time. As Christopher Jencks explained,
America's economic history since 1945 suggests that we need what
Marx called a "reserve al1ny of the unemployed." Without it, workers
will push up their V/ages fas ter th2J1 their productivity, inflation will
acceh:raw, and the Federal Reserve Board \Vill throw the economy
into a recession in order to restore price sts.bility. 76
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This flaw in market economics was exacerbated by the transformation of
the American economy after World War II that diminished the demand for
blue-collar and unskilled workers and particularly marginalized Black workers.77 Moreover, institutional barriers have prevented disempowered citizens
from fully participating in the political process and the economy. 78 As Loic
Wacquant and William Julius Wilson conclude, "[t]he growth of welfare in the
inner city is but a surface manifestation of deeper social-structural and economic changes, including deindustrialization, skyrocketing rates of joblessness,
the increasing concentration of poverty, and racial polarization." 79
Women are disadvantaged in the labor market by sex discrimination and
by workplace rules that assume workers have no child care obligations. 80
Black single mothers-who make up a disproportionate share of the AFDC
rolls- are frustrated by all of these structural impediments. While other industrialized countries structure their markets and social programs to reduce poverty and wage inequality, American social policies and legal rules actively encourage these conditions. 81
So far, these arguments refute the absolute rejection of public assistance
for the poor as undeserved. But why should the state provide more than the
minimal means of survival to needy citizens and why does the Constitution
require this? It is beyond the scope of this essay on unconstitutional conditions
to elaborate these redistributive constitutional arguments. I will suggest, however, two arguments elaborated by others that warrant further exploration and
advocacy .
First, we might replace the concept of privacy as a purely negative right
with the concept of liberty as human flourishing that affinnatively guarantees
the needs of human personhood. 82 Guided by a substantive vision of human
flourishing, this interpretation of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
requires the government to eliminate illegitimate social coercion based on race,
gender, and class, as well as to provide the prerequisites for meaningful par-

vatives assume that unemployment much below 6 percent is an unaccep table risk"); see also Paul
Davidson, Fighting Inflation Without Designated Paup ers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995 (letter to
editor) (c ritici zing pol icies that "require a permanent army of unemployed paupers to achieve a
prosperous, inflation-free economy").
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( 1982).
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ticipation in the national cornmunity. According to Robin West, "[t]he goal is
an affmnatively autonomous existence: a meaningfully flourishing, independent, enriched individual life." 83
Second, claims to public assistar:ce might also be based on the requirements of democracy. A truly democratic society has the obligation to provide
its members with the prerequisites of political partidpation. 84 William
Forbath, for example, draws upon an ideal of equality embodied in the Civil
War Amendments "in which racial and econorn.jc justice are entwined." 85 The
Reconstruction-era radicals' solution to the problem that poverty poses for
democracy was not the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, but redistribution
of wealth and resources. According to Forbath, "they thought, in Akhil Amar's
apt phrase, that ' property is such a good thing ... so constitutive, so essential
for both individual and collective self-governance,' that 'every citizen should
have some. " '86 Forbath finds historical support for a positive constitutional
vision that offers more than state provision of the bare minimum necessary for
subsistence. Instead of focusing on welfare entitlements, Forbath argues, every
previous generati on of reformers "sought more complex and autonomy-enhancing institutional reforms to secure the constitutional norms of decent livelihoods, independence, responsibility, and remunerative work. " 87
C ONCLUSION

The unc ons titu tional condi tions doc trine maintains the liberal connection
between property and privacy and the liberal separation between public intrusion and priv ate decisions. A progressive vision of economic and political
justice challenges both . Th1s general visi on leaves open a number of questions
about the c!aim to government assistance. Should we see it as a right to government fun ding of pa..:i:icular activities, or to broad economic redistribution
that ensures all citizens the property necessary for private autonomy and democratic participation? Should we prefer universal programs that might garner
broad -based support <U'ld blur distinctions between the poor and nonpoor or
means-tested and race-based p;-ograms strategically directed at di smantling
instituti onal inequali ties? Should v;e direct our efforts to the courts, legislatures, or both? Moreover, establishi ng a collective obligation to support the
prerequisites for ci.;;mocracy or human fl ourishing will not necessat-ily deprive
the gover:nrnen t of 3.ny povver to regulate the se. activities . But it '.Nill force the
govem meni 1o justify its regulation on more kgitimai:e terms. There are numerou s tasks to p :Jr oth~ in constn.lct1ng ;:-, more dignified and egalitarian we1fare
syste:rn. The lLC!con.::ti tntio:nal con di ti ons doc tri ne:, ho\vever) points us in the
wTong direction .
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